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Game Theoretical Analysis of Service Provision for
the Internet of Things Based on Sensor
Virtualization
Luis Guijarro, Vicent Pla, Jose R. Vidal and Maurizio Naldi
Abstract—The advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) is
expected to bring major benefits to a wide range of areas.
However, the successful deployment of the IoT calls for the
existence of sustainable and well-understood business models.
In this paper, we propose and analyze a business model for a
likely scenario in the IoT, which is made up of WSNs, service
providers and users. The service providers compete against each
other in the intermediation between the virtualized WSNs and
the users that benefit from enhanced services built on the sensed
data. The service providers pay to the WSNs for the data and
charge the users for the service. The model is analyzed by
applying oligopoly theory and game theory, the conditions for the
existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are established,
and the equilibrium and the social optimum are obtained. Our
results show that the business model is sustainable, provided that
the users’ sensitivity to the value-to-price ratio is not negligible
and, in this situation, the number of active service providers
is upper bounded by a value that depends on the sensitivity
and the market size. Furthermore, the operation of such a
market is shown to efficiently use the information provided by the
WSNs; and, when compared to the social optimum, to produce
an increase in users’ and service providers’ surpluses, but a
reduction in WSNs’ surplus.
Index Terms—Game theory, service provision, wireless sensor
networks, oligopoly, social welfare
I. INTRODUCTION
The “Internet of Things” (IoT) is one of the hottest topics
being debated today across industries worldwide. The esti-
mates of the number of smart objects in homes, offices, facto-
ries, vehicles and elsewhere are 50 billion by 2020, up from
12.5 billion in 2010 [1]. Although smart objects are becoming
omnipresent, the fact is that the market for services related to
these objects is immature. The commercial success of sensor-
based services needs that both the appropriate market structure
and corresponding pricing schemes be well understood [2].
Wireless sensor network-based service provision is a likely
scenario for IoT. In this paper we propose and analyze a
wireless sensor network-based service business model in order
to contribute to the understanding of the economics of this
scenario.
The proposed model consists of autonomous Wireless Sen-
sor Networks (WSNs) that sense data and sell the data to one
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or more service providers. Each service provider sets up a
platform that captures the sensing data, builds the service and
provides the service to the users; and it takes care of bundling
the solutions, sets the tariffs, bills the customers and provides
customer care [1].
Our study models a scenario of what is known as “Sensing
as a Service” [3], where providers build services based on
sensing data collected by third parties. There is a dominant
trend in the economy in general and specifically in the internet-
based service provision whereby companies specialize either
on service provision or on infrastructure operation; our work
is related to this trend. Among all scenarios covered by the
term “Sensing as a Service”, the scenarios that are amenable
to our model are those where it makes sense to pay for the
sensing data collected by WSNs. In these scenarios, the WSNs
are deployed and owned by entities interested in collecting
revenues that cover or help cover the deployment and operating
costs of the sensor infrastructure. On the other hand, there are
IoT services that do not fit onto the above paradigm, such
as smart water services, where the infrastructure is vertically
integrated by a utility company that both provides the service
and owns the sensor infrastructure. And there are IoT services
that would not be amenable to our model, like those based
on wearable devices, since individuals, who are the owners
of their wearable WSN, are currently not ready to engage in
multi-party data sharing agreements. An example would be
the following. WSNs may be deployed by high street stores,
restaurants and pubs to monitor the movement of customers
in and out their premises. This data may be aggregated to
build a real-time map of pedestrian density [4], and a service
build on geotagged pedestrian density information may be
provided to users interested in targeting high density pedestrian
spots, e.g., taxi cabs looking for potential riders or out-of-home
advertisers running highly targeted campaigns. The data may
be supplied with different time and/or spatial resolution and
may bear different delays and redundancy, which will translate
into different information rates, and ultimately into different
qualities of service for the users. The users will be willing to
pay a higher price for a better service quality, so that there is
room for a competition in both information rates and prices.
The proposed business model assumes a scenario where
more than one service provider operate in the market. Service
providers are assumed that neither own nor operate the WSNs.
The access of the service providers to the WSN-sensed data
is implemented through the virtualization of the WSNs [5].
Virtualization is a well-established concept that allows the
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abstraction of actual physical computing resources into logical
units, enabling the efficient usage by multiple independent
users. Adapted to WSNs, it can allow the efficient utilization of
WSN deployment, as multiple applications will be able to co-
exist on the same virtualized WSN. Virtualizing WSNs brings
many benefits, among which we would like to emphasize
the elimination of tight coupling between services/applications
and WSN deployments, allowing the definition on flexible
roles in a business model [6].
The proposed business model is formalized using an
analytic model based on microeconomics, specifically on
oligopoly theory [7]—as far as the competition between
the service providers is concerned, although concepts from
discrete-choice analysis are borrowed for the users modeling.
Game theory is extensively used for the model and the analysis
of the competition between the service providers. The solution
procedure is mainly analytical, although numerical non-linear
optimization is used in some parts of this paper.
The model incorporates some specifics related to the WSNs
operation, such as the influence of the information rate over
the user utility, and over the price paid to the WSNs. It also
borrows some fundamentals from microeconomics.
There are some studies that discuss which requirements a
sustainable business model should comply with in an Internet
of Things scenario [8] [9], but few of them have approached
this issue formally as our paper.
The authors proposed a business model for the service
provision in a WSN scenario in [10]. The focus in the work
was specifically to test the feasibility of a pricing mechanism
that emulated a two-sided market scenario. But the analysis
did not progress beyond a monopoly scenario. Likewise, the
authors proposed also an intermediation-based business model
in [11] and in [12], analyzing it just in a scenario with one
service provider. The present paper, however, succeeds in
analyzing the more realistic scenario of competition and it has
a broader scope than [10]. Reference [13] provides a survey on
the pricing schemes for IoT services and proposes a business
model where the provider intermediates between sensors and
users, like in our work. Several providers are modeled, but no
competition is allowed, which differs from our work. Actually,
the goal of [13] is to analyze whether providers will cooperate
in offering their IoT service as a bundle or not, and if so, how
to optimize the bundled subscription fee.
Interestingly, [14] models the competition in prices in the
provision of IoT services, as in our paper. The theoretical
framework is information economics, which departs from ours.
The model is simple, since the information source is binary,
but the approach is novel and promising because it can be
applied to model time-sensitive information and information
reselling.
There are also proposals of business models in cloud service
provision, where service providers compete for users and for
virtual resources from infrastructure providers [15]. The set-
ting in this work exhibits some parallelisms with our scenario.
However, there are specifics of cloud service provisioning
that are different from our scenario, e.g., pricing the on-spot
virtual computing resources, which is a crucial point in popular
















Fig. 1. Scenario model.
Finally, there are studies that focus instead on the hurdles
faced by IoT deployments that may compromise the feasibil-
ity of the business models supporting them. Reference [16]
discusses the CAPEX requirements, and provides examples of
IoT deployments that either exhibit CAPEX gains or require
small CAPEX. These issues are relevant at large time scales,
whereas our work focuses on mechanisms, e.g., pricing, that
operate at shorter time scales.
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
• We propose a business model for service provision in the
Internet of Things and show that is sustainable—i.e. an
equilibrium with active service providers earning positive
profits exists—provided that the user sensitivity to the
sensing-rate-to-price ratio is not negligible. And in this
situation the number of active service providers is upper
bounded by a value that depends on the sensitivity and
on the market size.
• An exhaustive analysis of the equilibria that the com-
petition yields is conducted and the conditions for their
existence and uniqueness are derived.
• The surpluses at the equilibrium for the different actors—
WSNs, service providers and users—are obtained and
compared with those at the social optimum.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II describes
the model. Section III solves the game and determines the
existence and uniqueness conditions for the Nash equilibrium.
Section IV presents the results and, finally, Section V draws
some conclusions.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
The scenario modeled in this paper is shown in Fig. 1 and
the details of the payment flows are provided in Figs. 2, 3 and
4. The scenario comprises N wireless sensor networks, K
service providers, M users, and one or more network access
providers. Next we describe the details of the model for each
of these agents. A summary of the notation used in this paper






Number of WSNs N 2
Number of connected WSNs (random variable) N 3
Information rate generated by WSN j rj 3
Random variable from which the rj ’s are drawn R 3
Price per unit of information rate charged by
WSNs
a 3
Network access fee payed by each WSN to a
Network Access Provider
f 3
Profit of WSN j Πj (1) 3
Expected number of connected WSNs n (3) 3





Expected aggregated information rate provided
by all connected WSNs
RT (5) 3
Inverse supply function a(RT ) (10) 4
WSNs surplus ΠWSNs (17) 6
Service providers (SPs)
Number of SPs K 2
Aggregated information rate that SP i obtains
from the WSNs
Ri 4
Priced charged by SP i to each of its subscribers pi 4
Profit of SP i Πi (16) 5
Aggregate profit of all SPs in the symmetric case Π(s)SPs (17) 6
Users
Number of users M 2
Objective part of the utility that a user obtains
from SP i
vi (12) 4
Sensitivity parameter µ 4
Subjective part of the utility that user u obtains
from SP i
κu,i 4
Users’ sensitivity parameter α 5
Number of users that subscribe to the ith service
provider
mi 5
Fraction of users that subscribe to the ith service
provider
σi (13) 5
Users’ surplus Πusers (14) 5
Users’ surplus in the symmetric case Π(s)users (15) 5
Analysis, results and auxiliary notation
Vector of zeros (ones) of the appropriate dimen-
sion
0 / (1) 7
CDF of the continuous uniform distribution in
[0, 1]
Ψ(·) 4
Upper bound of k that appears in certain condi-
tions
ηM (31) 7
Set of the integer numbers that lie in [ηm, ηM ) K 8
Social Welfare SW 13
Social Welfare in the symmetric case SW(s) (39) 14
p−i,R−i 6
Di(R−i) (19) 6
Nash equilibrium point (p∗,R∗) 6
Indices of the SPs entering the market I(p,R) (26) 7
Number of SPs entering the market k ≡ k(p,R) (27) 7
A(k) (28) 7
β (30) 7







Value at which Icond(x) crosses zero ηm 8
A. Wireless Sensor Networks
There exist N WSNs. Each WSN senses information, which
is bundled by the service providers in order to compose useful
services to the users.
WSN j generates information at a rate rj . We define
information rate as the net rate of sensing information that the
WSNs supply to the service providers. This information flow,
which we propose to measure in net bits per second (nbps),
is assumed to comply with the QoS requirements included in
the service level agreement between the WSNs and the service
providers, e.g., latency, reliability. This approach is in line
with the research that assesses the quality of information and
the value of information in sensor networks [17]. According
to this approach, we have considered that the existence of
possible redundancies in the data sensed by neighboring WSNs
is already taken into account in the value of the information
rate they supply to service providers.
Each WSN is paid an amount a · rj , where a is the price
per information rate unit and is the same for all WSNs, and
it pays a price f to a Network Access Provider (NAP), which
may be different from the service provider. All prices will be
measured in generic currency units (cu). While the link of the
sensors to the WSN gateway will obviously be wireless, the
connection of the WSN gateway to the NAP will typically be
through a fixed broadband line, for which the flat rate is the
typical choice —see, e.g., the survey by the Open Technology
Institute in [18] and the supporting rationale in [19]. It is to
be noted that, for the purpose of analysis, any additional fixed
costs that the WSN may incur may be incorporated in the fee
f . We assume that the number of WSNs is sufficiently high
so that each one is assumed to take prices a and f as given.
Therefore, provided that WSN j enters the market, it will
get the profit
Πj = a · rj − f, (1)
as depicted in Fig. 2. Note that the profit Πj cannot be negative
since WSN j will not enter the market if a · rj − f < 0, as it
is discussed next.
The WSNs are heterogeneous in their information rates
rj . We model this heterogeneity by assuming that the values
rj (j = 1, . . . , N) are samples of a random variable R
distributed in the interval [0, rmax]. In the general case this
random variable will be described by a probability distribution
function FR(x) = P(R ≤ x). WSN j will enter the market if
Πj ≥ 0, which is an event with probability










The number of connected WSNs, N , is then a random variable
and the expected number of connected WSNs, n, is given by







Additionally, the rate of a connected WSN has an expected















Given (3) and (4), the expected aggregate rate that all
connected WSNs supply, RT , is given by




















Since there are no available statistics on the actual distri-
bution of information rates that can be met across a wide
variety of WSNs, in the following we will consider a uniform
distribution as the best one to be used when we have no further
information, which is supported by their typical use as a non-
informative prior in a Bayesian framework [20]. Additionally,
the uniform distribution is appropriate for modeling a large
degree of heterogeneity among the WSNs. An example of
analysis for the monopoly case under the Zipf distribution,
which adopts a specific hierarchical set of rates for the WSNs,
is conducted in [21].
If R is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, rmax], the
expressions (2)–(5) take the form


































where fm = f/rmax, Rm = Nrmax/2 and Ψ(·) is the
cumulative distribution function of the uniform distribution in
[0, 1].
The expression for RT given in (9) can be interpreted as
an aggregate supply function, since it gives the total amount
of rate supplied by the WSNs for a given unit price a.
Regarded as a function of a, (9) can be inverted and the





The above expression can be interpreted as the unit price that
should be posted to the WSNs in order to obtain an aggregate
information rate RT , i.e., it is the inverse supply function. This
allows to model the set of connected WSNs in an aggregate
manner, as depicted in Fig. 3. This representation will be used
hereafter in this paper.
Finally, the WSNs’ surplus is defined as the sum of the






















Users are interested in accessing a range of services that
the service providers compose using the information they buy
from the WSNs.
We use a discrete-choice model for the modeling of the
users’ choices, which is frequently used in econometrics [22].









a · r1 f
a · rj f
a · rn
f
Fig. 2. Individual WSN model and payment flows.
n WSNs
a(RT ) ·RT
Fig. 3. Aggregate WSN model and payment flows.
u making the choice i is assumed to be equal to vi+κu,i: the
term vi encompasses the objective aspects of option i and is
the same for all users, while κu,i is an unobserved user-specific
value that is modeled on the global level as a random variable.
From the distribution of these i.i.d. variables, one can compute
the probability that a user selects option i, and when the user
population size M is sufficiently large, this corresponds to the
proportion of users making that choice.
In our model, the user choice is the choice of one of the
K service providers, which are indexed by i = 1, . . . ,K, and
we use i = 0 for the “no-provider” option.
To model the objective part of the users’ utility, we assume
that each user pays a flat-rate price pi to service provider i,
and receives an aggregate information rate Ri. Following [23],
we propose






Firstly, the higher the information rate a provider gets, the
higher the utility the user derives from the service. This
makes sense since services that process more precise data
can provide better quality. The dependence is logarithmic,
as there is an increasing evidence that user experience and
satisfaction in telecommunication scenarios follow logarithmic
laws [24]. Secondly, the dependence on the price is through a
negative logarithm, instead; or in other words, the ratio Ri/pi
is proposed to be the relevant magnitude for the utility. Thirdly,
µ > 0 is a sensitivity parameter. And fourthly, note that the
“no-provider” option may be characterized by a ratio R0/p0,
i.e., this option can be made more or less desirable by tuning
this ratio.
To model the unobserved user-specific part of the utility,
following the literature on discrete-choice models, we borrow
a logit model; specifically, we assume that each user-specific
random variable κu,i follows a Gumbel distribution of mean
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0 and parameter ν1. The choice of the Gumbel distribution
allows us to obtain a logistic function in the end.
Note that we assume that the users are price-takers, which
is a sensible assumption for a sufficiently high M .
We define σi as the number of users mi that subscribe to the
ith service provider over the total number of users M—against
the other K − 1 providers and the “no-provider” option. With










, i = 1, . . . ,K, (13)
where α = µ/ν is the users’ sensitivity parameter, that is,
it models the sensitivity to the information-rate-to-price ratio,
and as such, the higher α is, the more sensible the users are
to the information rate and the price chosen by each service
provider. In the limit, when α tends to infinity, the service
provider choosing the highest ratio will get all users; whereas
if α is equal to zero all service providers, including the “no-
provider”, will get exactly the same amount of users.
Finally, the users’ surplus is defined as the sum of the











For the symmetric case in which the values of Ri and pi are
the same for all service providers (Ri = Rj and pi = pj ,
i, j = 1, . . . ,K), this results in












Each Service Provider (SP) performs two basic roles in the
model:
• it composes services that are based on the information
generated by the WSN;
• it acts as an intermediary between users and WSNs,
which allows to decouple the pricing schemes on each
side.
There are K SPs competing in providing services to the
users and in being procured by the WSNs. The payment flow is
depicted in Fig. 4 and the strategic games played are explained
in detail below.
1) Competition in the resource procurement: There are
a number of SPs competing to access the information rate
resource from the WSNs.
The WSNs are assumed to be price takers and therefore are
modeled through the inverse supply function (10).
However, the SPs are not so numerous as to be assumed
price takers; on the contrary, they can influence the resource
price in two ways: both directly, through its own choice of Ri,
and indirectly, through its strategic influence on the choice of
each competitor Rl, l 6= i.
1The probability density function of the Gumbel distribution of mean 0




, where γ ≈ 0.57721
























Fig. 4. Full model and payment flows.
The appropriate model for the interaction between the K
SPs is therefore an oligopsony. Specifically, we propose a non-
cooperative simultaneous game with the following character-
istics. Each SP is a player. The strategy of the i-th SP is the
amount Ri of information rate to be procured and the payoff




· Ri. Here we note that the price
depends on the sum of the choices of each provider, which
relies on the following two assumptions. First, that the total
information rate procured by the WSNs matches the sum of
the SPs’ requests. This should be interpreted in the light of
the definition of information rate in Section II-A. And second,
that the information rate resource procured from the WSNs is
not reused among the service providers. The latter assumption
is realistic when modeling scenarios where wireless sensors
are virtualized, either at a node level or at a network level,
in such a way that the memory/CPU/sensing resource of a
physical sensor is partitioned and each part is allocated through
a virtual sensor node or network to a different application or
service provider [6].
2) Competition in the service provision: The same number
K of SPs compete against each other in the provision of the
service to the M users.
The users are assumed to be price takers and the demand
is modeled as described in Section II-B.
The competition between the K SPs, following the same
reasoning as above, is modeled as an oligopoly of a price
competition type. Specifically, we propose a non-cooperative
simultaneous game with the following characteristics. First,
each SP is a player. Second, each player’s strategy is the
following pair of choices: price pi charged to each subscriber,
and Ri. And third, the payoff is given by pi ·mi, where mi
encapsulates the dependence on the strategy of the K − 1
competitors.
3) Simultaneous competition: The two competition games
described above are played by the same K service providers.
Actually, the relevant payoff for each provider is the profit,
which equals the sum of the payoffs of the two competition
games, and results in the following expression:





Ri, i = 1, . . . ,K (16)
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where σi and a(·) are given by (13) and (10), respectively.
We propose that the two competition games are played
simultaneously, instead of sequentially. The rationale is that
the choice of Ri cannot be regarded as an investment choice
or a capital expenditure, but an operational expenditure, and
as such is executed within the same time scale as the pricing
decision on the users side.
Thus, the combined procurement and service competition
game is specified as follows:
• each one of the K service providers is a player;
• each player’s strategy is the following pair of choices:
price pi and Ri;
• the payoff is given by (16).
Note that there is a coupling between the two competition
games through the payoffs and through the strategies used.
Finally, the total SPs profits, for the special case of identical
Ri values and identical pi values, is given by:
Π
(s)
SPs = K(piMσi − a(KRi)Ri). (17)
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, the game defined in the previous section
is solved, that is, the Nash equilibrium is computed and the
conditions for existence and uniqueness are provided. As the
main result of our analysis, we prove that, when the users’
sensitivity is high enough (α > 1) and the number of SPs
(K) is below a certain upper limit (K < ηM ), there exists
a symmetric equilibrium in which all SPs enter the market
(see Propositions 4 and 5). We also show that, for α > 1 and
under some very specific conditions, other equilibria in which
not all SPs enter the market may exist. Finally, we also show
that when the user’s sensitivity is not high enough (α ≤ 1)
the only possible equilibrium, if any, is one in which no SP
enters the market.
Below we make some introductory remarks, and after that
we carry out the detailed analysis through a series of propo-
sitions and corollaries. In this section, we omit proofs of all
propositions and corollaries for the sake of brevity; the detailed
proofs can be found in an accompanying document [26]. At
the end of this section, in Subsection III-B, we summarize the
results of the analysis.
By recalling (13) and (16) we write the general expression
of the i-th provider’s profit









i = 1, . . . ,K, (18)
where p−i = (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pK) and R−i =
(R1, . . . , Ri−1, Ri+1, . . . , RK). By abuse of notation we will
sometimes denote Πi(pi, Ri;p−i,R−i) simply as Πi(pi, Ri)
or even Πi if such simplified notation is unambiguous.
Note that the model is overparameterized since the Πi’s de-
pend on p0 and R0 through their ratio R0/p0 and not through
their individual values. Thus, we can set R0 = 1. Moreover,
without any loss of generality, we can also set p0 = 1, which
is equivalent to a normalization of all monetary/utility values
by p0. In other words, this is as if we were using a currency
unit so that the price p0 expressed in that currency is 1.
We need to consider the case in which one or more SPs
decide not to enter the market. The situation in which SP
j does not enter the market corresponds to (pj , Rj) = (0, 0),
which calls for an extension of the definition of Πj , since (18)
is not defined when pj = 0 for some j = 1, . . . ,K.
In the redefinition of the SP profits the following aspects
are considered:
• If SP j does not enter the market, i.e. (pj , Rj) = (0, 0),
we should have that Πj = 0, and from the perspective of
a different SP i it should be as if SP j did not exist.
• For any pi ≥ 0, Πi(pi, 0;p−i,R−i) =
Πi(0, 0;p−i,R−i) = 0, which has a clear interpretation,
because if Ri = 0, no user will subscribe to SP i, and
then the price pi posted by SP i is completely irrelevant.
Therefore, for all intents and purposes, we can consider
all the points (pi, Ri) of the form (pi, 0) as equivalent
to, and thus represented by, the point (0, 0).
• For an SP it does not make sense to utilize
a strategy of the form (0, Ri) with Ri > 0,
since Πi(0, Ri;p−i,R−i) = −a(
∑K
j=1Rj)Ri <
Πi(0, 0;p−i,R−i) = 0. In other words, a point in which
pi = 0 and Ri > 0 could never be an equilibrium since
SP i would be better off by playing (0, 0).
Now, let (p−i,R−i) be a fixed pair of (K − 1)-tuples such
that





j = 1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . ,K
and
∑
j 6=iRj < Rm. The function Πi(pi, Ri;p−i,R−i), i =
1, . . . ,K, can be defined in the domain
Di(R−i) = {(0, 0)} ∪




















The discussion above is summarized in the following propo-
sition that gives necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for a
point to be an equilibrium.




1, . . . , R
∗
K))
is a (Nash) equilibrium point then, for each i = 1, . . . ,K, one
of the following two conditions must be met
1) (p∗i , R
∗
i ) = (0, 0), i.e., the SP does not enter the market;
2) (p∗i , R
∗
i ) is a maximum of Πi(pi, Ri;p−i,R−i) in














i ;p−i,R−i) = 0.
(21)
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The following proposition provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for (0,0) being an equilibrium2. Note that the
point (0,0) represents the situation in which no SP enters
the market.
Proposition 2:
1) If 0 ≤ α < 1, then (0,0) is not an equilibrium.
2) If α = 1, then (0,0) is an equilibrium iff fm/M ≥ 1.
3) If α > 1, then (0,0) is an equilibrium iff fm/M ≥
(α− 1)1−1/α · α−1.
a) If fm/M ≥ 1, then (0,0) is an equilibrium for
any α ∈ (1,∞).
b) If fm/M < 1/2, then (0,0) is not an equilibrium
for any α ∈ (1,∞).
c) If 1/2 ≤ fm/M < 1, there exist α1 and α2 (1 <
α1 ≤ 2 ≤ α2) such that (0,0) is an equilibrium if
α ∈ [α1, α2] and it is not otherwise.
Now we seek equilibrium points other than (0,0). For this
we first look for pairs (pi, Ri) 6= (0, 0) that meet the second
condition in Proposition 1.
To obtain the partial derivatives of (16) we first write the





























where the function a(·) was defined in (10).
Below we deal separately with the case where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
and the more complex and richer one where α > 1.
Proposition 3: If 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 there are no equilibria different
from (0,0).
The following corollary, which follows immediately from
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, summarizes the situation
regarding possible equilibria when 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Corollary 1:
1) If 0 ≤ α < 1, there are no equilibrium points.
2) If α = 1, then (0,0) is the only possible equilibrium
equilibrium point, and it exists iff fm/M ≥ 1.
Unlike the case α ≤ 1, when α > 1 equilibrium points
other than (0,0) can exist. Proposition 4 provides some
structural properties of these equilibrium points, as well as
necessary conditions for their existence. Before formulating
this proposition, we need to introduce some definitions and
notations.
2The notation/symbol 0 represents a vector of zeros of the appropriate
dimension. Likewise, 1 represents a vector of ones of the appropriate
dimension.
For a given point (p,R) 6= (0,0), we denote by k(p,R),
or simply k, the number of SPs entering the market, and by
I(p,R) the set of indices of these SPs. Formally,
I(p,R) = { j ∈ {1, . . . ,K} | pj 6= 0, Rj 6= 0 } , (26)
k(p,R) = |I(p,R)|. (27)












Furthermore, if A(k) > 1 let z0(k) represent the unique












Note that, on account of Lemma 1 in [26], z0(k) is well
defined.
Proposition 4: Let α > 1 and let us assume that (p∗,R∗) 6=
(0,0) is an equilibrium point. Then
1) The number of SPs that enter the market in this equi-
librium point, k ≡ k(p∗,R∗), is upper-bounded as
k < ηM ,















2) The equilibrium strategy, (p∗i , R
∗
i ), of all the SPs that
enter the market is the same
(p∗i , R
∗
i ) = (p













3) The fraction of users that subscribe to each SP entering
the market solely depends on the users’ sensitivity, and




for all i ∈ I(p∗,R∗). (34)
Proposition 4 establishes some necessary conditions and
characteristics that the equilibrium points different from (0,0)
must have. Note, however, that this proposition provides no
information about the existence or the uniqueness of the
equilibrium. In other words, Proposition 4 does not rule out
the possibility that no such equilibrium exits, or that there exist
more than one (each with a different number of SPs entering
the market).
Combining Proposition 2, Corollary 1 and Proposition 4
gives the following corollary, which asserts that if the situation
when no SP enters the market is an equilibrium then there are
no other equilibria.
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Corollary 2: If (0,0) is an equilibrium then it is the unique
equilibrium.
It is worth recalling that so far, in the case α > 1, we
are dealing with just potential equilibrium points. In the next
two propositions the required conditions for these potential
equilibrium points to be actual equilibria are established.
Specifically, the next proposition states that if the total number
of SPs (K) is below the upper bound ηM and all the K SPs
enter the market, then the 2K-tuple of the form given in
Proposition 4 (with k = K) is indeed an equilibrium point.
Proposition 5: Let α > 1, and ηM , p∗(K), R∗(K) as
defined, respectively, in Eqs. (31), (33), (32). If K < ηM ,
then (p∗,R∗) =
(




The next proposition provides, along with Proposition 4,
the necessary and sufficient conditions to have a non-trivial
equilibrium in which not all the K SPs enter the market.
Proposition 6: Let α > 1, and (p∗,R∗) 6= (0,0) be a
point fulfilling the necessary conditions to be an equilibrium









From a practical perspective, the previous proposition pro-
vides limited insight into the values of k < ηM that meet the
condition in (35) and hence yield a non-trivial equilibrium.
We now turn our attention to this question so as to obtain a
more insightful and operational characterization of the values
of k that satisfy (35).










which is defined in [1, ηM ) and indicates (with a non-negative
value) whether x satisfies the condition in (35). Note that, for
convenience in our analysis, here we allow x to take non-
integer values.
Firstly, we observe that if x is sufficiently close to ηM , then
the condition is satisfied. Indeed, it is a simple matter to check
that letting x→ η−M yields A(x)→ 1 and z0(x)→ 0. Hence,




1/α − 1 > 0. (37)
Secondly, by numerical evaluation we have checked that
in the interval [1, ηM ) the function Icond(x) is increasing and
crosses zero at a value near ηM (see Fig. 5). Let us denote by
ηm the value at which Icond(x) crosses zero, i.e., Icond(ηm) =
0.
Therefore, a point (p,R) in which some, but not all, SPs
enter the market (0 < k(p,R) < K) is an equilibrium point
iff has the form given in Proposition 4 and
k(p,R) ∈ [ηm, ηM ).
Figure 6 shows that ηm/ηM is always very close to 1, and
that it tends to be even closer as α or M increase.














































Fig. 5. Graphical representation of Icond(x): left, α = 1.01; right, α = 1.4
In Fig. 7 we plotted the length of the interval [ηm, ηM ) as a
function of α (starting at α = 1.005) for different values of M .
The length of the interval can be arbitrarily large by choosing
α close enough to 1, but falls very rapidly as α grows above
1 (at α = 1.01 all curves have dropped below 1).
Rather than the length of the interval [ηm, ηM ) our interest
here is the number of integers it contains; they are closely
related, but are not exactly the same thing. Let K = [ηm, ηM )∩
Z be the set of the integer numbers that lie in [ηm, ηM ), and
|K| its cardinality (0 ≤ |K| = bηMc − dηme + 1). According
to our previous observations from Fig. 7, if α is close enough
to 1, the set K will contain many integers. On the other hand,
when α grows and we have ηM −ηm ≤ 1, then (ηm, ηM ) will
contain none or one integer number, i.e., |K| ≤ 1. Indeed, for
values of α beyond a certain threshold (which is not far above
from 1) we have K = ∅, except for a series of short intervals
that get sparser as α increases.
B. Summary of the results of the analysis
Our analysis has shown that α ≥ 1 is a necessary condition
for an equilibrium to exist. We can interpret this condition as
9






















Fig. 6. Position of ηm relative to ηM .




















Fig. 7. Length of the interval [ηm, ηM ).
follows: the users need be sensitive enough to the ratio Ri/pi
so that each provider’s strategy may attract users in an effective
manner. Otherwise, the interaction between the providers will
not have any equilibrium.
Table II summarizes the possible equilibrium situations
when α > 1, derived in Propositions 5 and 6. The table reports
the number of SPs that, for each situation, will enter the market
in equilibrium. We recall that in all cases all SPs entering the
market will play the same strategy. When ηM ≤ 1 no SP
enters the market in the equilibrium (i.e., (0,0) is the only
equilibrium point). However, this situation is not expected to
occur in real settings since it requires a relatively high value
for fm/M (at least 0.5; see Proposition 2), which amounts to
a very low number of end users, M .
When ηM > 1 there are two possible situations depending
on whether the number of SPs, K, is below or above the
thresholds value ηm. If K ≤ dηme there exists a unique
equilibrium in which all the K SPs enter the market.
TABLE II
NUMBER OF SPS, OUT OF A TOTAL OF K , THAT IN EQUILIBRIUM ENTER
THE MARKET WHEN α > 1
ηM > 1
ηM ≤ 1 K ≤ dηme K > dηme
0 0 K no equilibrium exists
|K
|
1 0 K dηme
> 1 0 K dηme, dηme+ 1, . . . , min{K, bηM c}
When K > dηme (and ηM > 1) we need to consider three
different cases depending on the number of integer numbers
there are in the interval [ηm, ηM ), i.e. |K|:
1) If |K| = 0 no equilibrium exists.
2) if |K| = 1 there is one equilibrium type in which dηme
out of K SPs enter the market. Note that here the
equilibrium is unique up to the selection of the dηme
indices.
3) If |K| > 1 there are several possible equilibrium types
with a different number of SPs entering the market in
each of them (dηme, dηme + 1, . . .). Again, for each of
these types the equilibrium is unique up to the selection
of indices.
Our previous numerical analysis showed that the third case
(|K| > 1) can only arise for a very narrow range of values of
α near 1; (1 < α < 1.01 or narrower for the studied scenarios;
see Fig 7). Otherwise, only the first and second case (i.e, no
equilibrium or one equilibrium type with some SPs outside
the market) are possible.
Finally, all the results in this section about the existence of
equilibria can be summarized as follows:
• 0 ≤ α < 1: There are no equilibrium points (Corollary 1).
• α = 1: (0,0) is an equilibrium iff fm/M ≥ 1 (Corol-
lary 1).
• α ≥ 1: Two types of equilibrium, which are mutually
exclusive (Corollary 2), are possible.
1) (0,0) is an equilibrium iff fm/M ≥ (α −
1)1−1/α/α (Proposition 2).
2) If (p∗,R∗) 6= (0,0) is an equilibrium point in
which k ≡ k(p∗,R∗) SPs enter the market, 0 <
k ≤ K, then it is necessary, but no sufficient, that
k < ηM (Proposition 4).
a) If k = K the condition given above is sufficient
as well, i.e., (p∗,R∗) is an equilibrium iff k =
K < ηM (Proposition 5).
b) If k < K an additional condition is required
for sufficiency, i.e., (p∗,R∗) is an equilibrium
iff ηm ≤ k < ηM (Proposition 6 and ensuing
discussion).
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, the behavior of the system in the Nash
equilibrium for the competition game, in those cases when it
is not (0,0), is explored. Firstly, the dependency of the upper
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bound of the number of active SPs (ηM ) with the sensitivity
and number of users is studied. Secondly, we explore the
strategy (R∗i , p
∗
i ) and the resulting surpluses in non-trivial
symmetric equilibrium and their dependency with the rest of
the system parameters. Thirdly, the strategies and surpluses in
equilibrium are compared with those that result in the optimal
welfare. And fourthly, SPs profits achieved in equilibrium
are compared with those obtained when SPs are allowed
to cooperate. For all the subsequent study we have set the
following parameters: fm = 1 cu, rmax = 1 nbps, R0 = 1
nbps and p0 = 1 cu.
A. Upper bound of the number of active SPs
Let us examine first how many service providers enter the
market. In Fig. 8, the value of the upper bound of the number
of active SPs, ηM , is represented as a function of the user
sensitivity, α. In Fig. 9, ηM is represented as a function of the
price paid to the NAPs normalized by M . Both figures use a
logarithmic scale.
The following effects can be observed:
• ηM decreases significantly as the sensitivity α increases,
which means that the greater sensitivity of users, the
less room for competing providers. A higher value for
α translates into a fiercer competition between service
providers. This situation induces a less stable strategic
interaction between the providers, which would explain
why only equilibria with a lower number of providers
exist.
• For α < 2, ηM is greater than 1, implying that there
exists an equilibrium with more than one active SP. Addi-
tionally, following from (34), which gives the fraction of
users who subscribe to each SP, the total fraction of users
that subscribe, i.e. the penetration rate, will be K times
the penetration rate in the case of the monopoly. In [12],
we showed that in a monopolistic scenario the fraction
of subscribers is typically low—as a matter of fact, it
would tend to zero when α approaches 1. Our results here
show that this limitation can be completely overcome by
allowing competition. In Fig. 10, the penetration rate is
represented, as a function of α, in both a competition and
a monopoly setting (the number of users is M = 1000).
We observe that the penetration rate in the competitive
setting is always higher than that of the monopolistic
setting, and is much higher when α approaches 1.
• ηM decreases only slightly as fm/M increases. As we
will see below, the influence of fm/M and therefore of
M on the equilibrium is negligible.
B. Strategy in symmetric equilibrium
The following figures show in a semilogarithmic scale
the variation of the price, the rate, the rate-price ratio, the
SPs profits, the users’ surplus and the WSNs’ surplus at
the equilibrium, as a function of the users sensitivity α, for
different values of the number of users, M , (Figs. 11, 13, 15,
17, 19 and 21) and of the number of WSNs, N , (Figs. 12, 14,
16, 18, 20 and 22). In those plots containing different values






















































Fig. 9. ηM for different α values.















Fig. 10. Penetration rate in competition vs. monopoly.
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of the number of users, M , the number of WSNs is set at
N = 10; in those containing different values of the number
of WSNs, N , the number of users is set at M = 1000. And
the number of SPs is set to K = 9.
The values represented are computed by numerical evalua-
tion of the expressions derived in Section III. For all the values
represented the competition results in a unique symmetric
equilibrium.
We can observe the following:
• As regards the equilibrium strategy (R∗i , p
∗
i ),
– The price p∗i (in cu’s) decreases as the sensitivity α
increases, since an increased users sensitivity to price
induces competition in providers, which results in a
fall in the price (Figs. 11 and 12). The influence of
M on p∗i in negligible, except for very low and likely
unrealistic values of M (Fig. 11). On the other hand,
it increases when N increases (Fig. 12), since the
total rate Rm available for providing service to the
users increases, which increases the objective part
of the users’ utility, and this allows the providers to
raise the price.
– The rate R∗i (in nbps) decreases only slightly with
the sensitivity α (Figs. 13 and 14). It approaches the
maximum value (which is, being N = 10 and rmax =
1, Rm = 5) when M increases (Fig. 13), since the
higher M is, the higher the price the providers can
pay for the resource, and the higher the rate procured.
This happens regardless of the value of M , provided
that M is not too low. The plot shows that this is
true for values of M above 100, but note that a lower
number of users would be unrealistic. As regards the
dependence on N , the rate R∗i increases when N
increases (Fig. 14), since the total available rate Rm
also increases.
– Note that the statement that the influence of M on
(R∗i , p
∗
i ) is negligible holds as long as M is above
a critical amount; In the case discussed here the
value M = 100 is above this critical amount. M
values lower than this critical value are too low to




– The ratio R∗i /p∗i (nbps/cu) increases as as the sen-
sitivity α increases (Figs. 15 and 16), since the
effect of α is stronger on the price than on the rate.
However, there is no effect of M and of N on R∗i /p
∗
i ,
which implies that the fraction of users that subscribe
to each provider σi remains unchanged (see (13)) and
also the total fraction of subscribers (as anticipated
in (34) in Proposition 4.).
• As regards the surplus of each agent, bearing in mind that
the equilibrium is symmetric:
– The aggregate profit of all SP’s, Π(s)SPs (in cu’s),
given by (17), decreases as the sensitivity α increases
(Figs. 17 and 18), since the competition between
the providers is fiercer, which translates to reduced
profits. As M increases, ΠSPs increases (Fig. 17).
Two effects intervene here: on the one hand, the























Fig. 11. pi in equilibrium for different M values.




















Fig. 12. pi in equilibrium for different N values.

















Fig. 13. Ri in equilibrium for different M values.
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Fig. 14. Ri in equilibrium for different N values.























Fig. 15. Ri/pi in equilibrium for different M values.




















Fig. 16. Ri/pi in equilibrium for different N values.



































Fig. 17. ΠSPs in equilibrium for different M values.
revenues Mσipi of each provider increase, since
σi remains unchanged—as reasoned above, and the
price only varies slightly; on the other hand, the costs
aR∗i increase just slightly due to slight increments
in the information rates Ri and consequently in
the price a. And the first effect dominates. As N
increases, ΠSPs increases (Fig. 18), since the SPs
may request more resources at roughly the same
price a and therefore may ask users for a higher
price.
– Users’ surplus Πusers (in cu’s), given by (15), in-
creases as the sensitivity α increases (Figs. 19
and 20), bearing in mind that, as discussed above,
the ratio R∗i /p
∗
i increases; indeed, more sensitive
users will be able to extract more surplus from
the providers. From (33), the number of users, M ,
or the number of WSNs, N , have no impact on
R∗i /p
∗
i . Consequently, as it may have been antici-
pated from (15), we observe a linear growth of Πusers
with M (Fig. 19) and no variation with N (Fig. 20).
– WSNs’ surplus ΠWSNs (in cu’s), given by (11),
decreases as the sensitivity α increases (Figs. 21
and 22), since a fiercer competition at the users side
translates to a lower price a paid at the WSNs side.
ΠWSNs increases as M increases (Fig. 21), since
the rate requested by the providers approaches Rm
and therefore the price paid a increases significantly
(Eq. 10). Finally, ΠWSNs increases as N increases
(Fig. 22), since the total available rate Rm increases
and also the total rate requested by the providers.
To sum up, assuming that a critical mass of users is present,
an equilibrium is reached characterized by the following. First,
almost all available rate from the N WSNs is procured to
the service providers, which compete in prices for the users.
Second, the number of users, M , and WSNs, N , do not
influence the ratio R∗i /p
∗
i , and therefore more users lead to
higher surplus for SPs, WSNs and users, while more WSNs
lead to higher surplus just for SPs and WSNs. And third,
13


























Fig. 18. ΠSPs in equilibrium for different N values.





































Fig. 19. Users’ surplus in equilibrium for different M values.




























Fig. 20. Users’ surplus in equilibrium for different N values.






























Fig. 21. WSNs’ surplus in equilibrium for different M values.

























Fig. 22. WSNs’ surplus in equilibrium for different N values.
the sensitivity α influences not only the resulting equilibrium,
with higher α translating to higher surplus for the users but
lower profits for the SPs and for the WSNs, but also the very
existence of the equilibrium, since higher α makes equilibrium
for numerous providers not feasible.
C. Social welfare
The values are now assessed from the point of view of the
social welfare.
Social Welfare SW is defined as the sum of the users’
surplus, the WSNs’ surplus and the SPs’ profit. The maximum
Social Welfare is called social optimum SO, which can be






SW(R1, . . . , RK , p1, . . . , pK).
(38)
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Assume that (pi, Ri) 6= (0, 0) for k providers. By means
of numerical optimization, we have found that the social
optimum is achieved at a symmetric 2K-tuple with identical
Ri’s and identical pi’s. Therefore, in order to compute the
social optimum, we only need the SW expression for the
symmetric case. The expressions for the users’ surplus and the
SPs’ profit in the symmetric case and for the WSNs’ surplus
have been obtained in (15), (17) and (11), respectively. The
Social Welfare in the symmetric case, SW(s), is then
SW(s)(Ri, pi) =
Π(s)users(Ri, pi) + ΠWSNs(Ri, pi) + Π
(s)
SPs(Ri, pi), (39)




In order to measure the loss of efficiency due to the selfish
behavior of service providers, we will use the price of anarchy






where a symmetric 2K-tuple with identical R∗i ’s and identical
p∗i ’s is a (Nash) equilibrium point. The social optimum has
been computed by numerical maximization while the social
welfare at the equilibrium has been computed using the
analytical expressions.
In all of the following plots, the users sensitivity is set at
α = 1.1. For the parameter values used, ηM = 10.993 and
ηm = 10.986, so that the competition results in a unique
symmetric equilibrium for a number of SPs K ≤ 10. And the
following values are used: M = 1000 and N = 10. Fig. 23
(respectively, Fig. 24) shows the equilibrium and optimum Ri
(respectively, pi) as a function of the number of providers
K. Figs. 25, 26, 27 and 28 show the equilibrium and social
optimum Πusers, ΠSPs, ΠWSNs, and SW , respectively, as a
function of K. All graphs are plot in a semilogarithmic scale,
except Fig. 26, which is plot in a linear scale.
Fig. 23 shows that, both in equilibrium and in the optimal
welfare, Ri is close to the maximum (Rm/K), that is, almost
all the available information rate is supplied to the providers,
with a slight difference in favor of the social optimum. This
is best seen in Fig. 29, in which Ri is normalized relative to
the K-th fraction of the available rate (Rm/K). This figure
shows that RiK/Rm in equilibrium presents a maximum at
approximately half the range of K. We have experimentally
found that such behavior, hard to explain because of the
complexity of the system equilibria, remains qualitatively the
same for a wide range of values of parameters α, M and N .
In Fig. 24 it can be seen that price pi charged to users
decreases rapidly with the number of competing providers K,
while it decreases much more slowly for the optimal welfare.
The consequences of this behavior can be seen in Figs. 25,
26, 27 and 28. On the one hand, in the competition case, as
K increases, the profits shifts from the providers (Fig. 26) to
the users (Fig. 25), while the WSNs’ surplus only increases
slightly up to a maximum when K = 5, and then decreases but
not as dramatically as the SPs profits (Fig. 27). On the other










Fig. 23. Ri in equilibrium and in optimal welfare.
















Fig. 24. pi in equilibrium and in optimal welfare.























Fig. 25. Users’ surplus in equilibrium and in optimal welfare.
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Fig. 26. SPs profits in equilibrium and in optimal welfare.






















Fig. 27. WSNs’ surplus in equilibrium and in optimal welfare.





















































Fig. 28. Social welfare in equilibrium and in optimal welfare, and price of
anarchy.


























Fig. 29. Ri ·K/Rm in equilibrium and in optimal welfare.
hand, in the social optimum case, SPs profits are zero (Fig. 26),
which means that maximum social welfare implies setting
intermediation profits to zero. As K increases, users’ surplus
increases slightly (Fig. 25) and WSNs’ surplus decreases
(Fig. 27), resulting in a decrease in the social welfare (Fig. 28),
up to the value K = 8. As expected by the definition of social
optimum, the social welfare is greater for the social optimum
than for the competition (Fig. 28), and the gap between them
is roughly greater when K increases, since the efficiency loss
due to the non-cooperative strategic interaction increases when
the number of players increases. This is also seen in the curve
of the price of anarchy (Fig. 28), defined as the the ratio
between the optimal social welfare and the social welfare in
equilibrium. Again, this applies up to the value K = 8, and
from this value the gap is reduced; this particularity deserves
a deeper discussion that is deferred for further study.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions can be drawn from our study:
• An intermediation business model is proposed for WSN-
based service provision, which is sustainable provided
that the user sensitivity to the sensing-rate-to-price ratio
is not negligible. And in this situation the number of
active service providers is upper bounded by a value that
depends on the sensitivity and on the market size.
• The operation of such a market is shown to be able to
use all available information generated by the WSNs, and
therefore to provide a near-maximum quality service.
• The sensitivity of users toward the information-rate-to-
price ratio has been shown to be of utmost importance,
not only because influences the distribution of the sur-
plus between the producers, the intermediaries and the
users, but also because it determines the existence of the
equilibrium in the competition game.
• Compared to the social optimum, the competition out-
come has been shown to match the utilization of the
resources, to deliver a better surplus to the users and to
the intermediaries, but to leave the WSNs worse off.
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